India's rule on computer-generated works is often described as a copy of the UK's. The UK government now proposes to remove its version, but India has no reason to follow. The two provisions are built differently, and the problem that sinks the UK provision does not arise in the same form in India.

India’s rule on computer-generated works is often described as a copy of the UK’s. The UK government now proposes to remove its version, but India has no reason to follow. The two provisions are built differently, and the problem that sinks the UK provision does not arise in the same form in India.

Two provisions that look alike

Under section 9(3) of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, the author of a computer-generated literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.”1 India’s section 2(d)(vi) names “the person who causes the work to be created.”2 The wording is close; the provisions around it are not.

The UK Act defines a computer-generated work as one “generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work.”3 It then gives such works a separate regime. Protection lasts 50 years from the end of the year the work was made, rather than for the author’s life plus a period.4 And the moral rights to be identified as author and to object to derogatory treatment do not apply to them.5

India has none of this. The Act does not define “computer-generated” at all.6 Copyright in a published literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work runs until sixty years after the author’s death, with no special rule for computer-generated works.7 The author’s moral rights under section 57 carry no exclusion for computer-generated works either.8 The UK built a separate regime for works with no human author, while India added one line to its list of who counts as the author.

The UK’s problem

The UK provision applies only to original works, and under current UK law originality means the author’s own intellectual creation. The UK government’s March 2026 report points to the difficulty: that test “is very much associated with human qualities, suggesting that a work created by a non-human could not be ‘original’. However, section 9(3) only applies to works ‘without a human author’.”9

Patrick Goold set out the dilemma in 2021. If such works must be original, the only coherent conceptions of originality “necessarily assume the existence of a human author,” so “the provision is simply unnecessary.” If they need not be original, it protects works that belong in the public domain.10 He concluded that “the UK ought to consider abolishing section 9(3).”11

The government reached a similar view. Finding minimal evidence that the protection is used or has a material effect, it proposes that, “in the absence of evidence of its ongoing value,” the protection “should be removed.”12 As of 24 October 2026 we have found no report that the proposal has been enacted.

Why the UK problem does not carry over

Goold’s dilemma depends on one feature: section 9(3) applies only where there is no human author. India’s provision has no such limit. On our reading, section 2(d)(vi) is a rule about attribution. It decides which person counts as the author when a computer produces the work, and it can apply whether or not a human also shaped the expression.

India can therefore require the named person to meet the ordinary originality standard without making section 2(d)(vi) pointless, because the provision still settles which of several possible humans (the developer, the business deploying the tool or the user) is the author. The other clauses of section 2(d) do not directly address that question for machine-executed works. Part 2 of this series discussed how the DABUS order approaches it.

The same feature answers a concern raised in the DABUS proceedings. The amicus argued that holding every autonomously generated output unoriginal “would substantially deprive the category of computer-generated works of practical content.”13 That would be true of the UK provision, which covers only works with no human author. It is less true of India’s, which still has work to do where human and machine both contribute.

What originality requires in India

The governing authority is the Supreme Court’s decision in Eastern Book Co. v. D.B. Modak. The Court held that “the author must produce the material with exercise of his skill and judgment,” that copyright “does require a minimal degree of creativity,” and that the protected inputs in that case were not “a mechanical process.”14 The language is about the author’s own skill and judgment. The case concerned edited law reports, and the Court confined its decision to “the judgments of the courts which are in the public domain.”15 It did not consider machines. But it is the Supreme Court’s statement of the originality standard, and the Registrar applied it in the DABUS order.16

The DABUS order took a different path. Reading section 13 with section 2(d)(vi), it assessed originality in the output and held that the absence of real-time human intervention “does not, by itself, defeat originality.”17 Two points limit that finding. The order confined it to “the material placed in the present registration proceedings.”18 And the result did not depend on it, since the application failed on authorship and ownership.19 The Copyright Office’s own initial objection had read Modak as requiring creativity “arising from human intellectual effort.”20

Our view is that the better reading treats originality as a second hurdle. Section 2(d)(vi) names the person; that person must then show the skill and judgment Modak describes, reflected in the work. This follows Modak’s text and gives section 2(d)(vi) a job that does not depend on protecting works no human shaped, which is the feature that led the UK to propose repeal. No Indian court has yet decided the point.

Practical points for foreign counsel

  • UK section 9(3) analysis does not map onto India. The definitions, term and moral-rights rules differ, and so do the arguments for keeping or removing the provision.
  • A UK repeal would not change Indian law. India’s provision stands on its own text, and the Indian government has stated publicly that the existing framework is adequate for AI-generated works.21
  • For clients who want Indian protection for AI-assisted work, records of selection, arrangement and editing are the strongest support for originality.
  • The government committee that published Part 1 of its working paper on AI and copyright said Part 2 would cover authorship of AI outputs.22 And the DABUS order is not a court judgment; a court may take a different view. As of 24 October 2026 we have found neither Part 2 nor any reported challenge to the order.

Footnotes

  1. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 9(3) (U.K.). ↩

  2. Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957, § 2(d)(vi) (India). ↩

  3. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 § 178. ↩

  4. Id. § 12(7). ↩

  5. Id. §§ 79(2)(c), 81(2). ↩

  6. See Copyright Act § 2. ↩

  7. Id. § 22. ↩

  8. Id. § 57. ↩

  9. Dep’t for Sci., Innovation & Tech. & Dep’t for Culture, Media & Sport, Report on Copyright and Artificial Intelligence § I, ¶ 14, at 105–06 (Mar. 2026) (U.K.) [hereinafter UK Report]. ↩

  10. Patrick Goold, The Curious Case of Computer-Generated Works Under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 3, 17 (City L. Sch. Rsch. Paper No. 2021/03, 2021), revised version published at [2021] I.P.Q. 120. ↩

  11. Id. at 21. ↩

  12. UK Report, supra note 9, § I, ¶¶ 52–53, at 111. ↩

  13. In re Diary No. 9356/2022-CO/A, ¶ 31 (Registrar of Copyrights, India Aug. 31, 2026) (submission of the amicus curiae) [hereinafter DABUS Order]. ↩

  14. Eastern Book Co. v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1, ¶¶ 57, 60–61 (India). ↩

  15. Id. ¶ 57. ↩

  16. See DABUS Order ¶¶ 40–44. ↩

  17. Id. ¶¶ 41–47. ↩

  18. Id. ¶ 50; see also id. ¶ 48. ↩

  19. See id. ¶¶ 128, 164–172, 190. ↩

  20. Id. ¶ 7. ↩

  21. Press Release, Ministry of Com. & Indus., Existing IPR Regime Well-Equipped to Protect AI Generated Works, No Need to Create Separate Category of Rights (Feb. 9, 2024) (India) (Release ID 2004715). ↩

  22. Dep’t for Promotion of Indus. & Internal Trade, Working Paper on Generative AI and Copyright, Part 1 9 (Dec. 2025) (India). ↩

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